High [CVE-2026-33264 +1] Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server

Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported.

An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant.

The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`.

Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required.

This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again.

Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.