High [CVE-2026-103262] Denial of Service via decompression bomb in CurlAsyncHTTPClient
This high-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-103262; related products: Lightspeed Core, Migration Toolkit for Applications 8, OpenShift Lightspeed.
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Summary
Denial of Service via decompression bomb in CurlAsyncHTTPClient. Red Hat rates this important (CVSS 7.5).
Weakness: CWE-409.
Affected products named by the advisory: Lightspeed Core; Migration Toolkit for Applications 8; OpenShift Lightspeed; Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2; and 10 more.
Affected products named by the advisory: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8; Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3; and 6 more.
Affected versions
No affected-version range was extracted from the source record. The vendor advisory is authoritative — check it before change work.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 4 days ago·verify at source
Fixed versions
No fixed release is recorded yet. That does not prove no patch exists — confirm against the vendor advisory.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 4 days ago·verify at source
Mitigation checklist
- Restrict outbound HTTP client requests to trusted destinations and avoid using the CurlAsyncHTTPClient backend when fetching untrusted web content. 1. Application configuration: Configure Tornado applications to utilize the default SimpleAsyncHTTPClient instead of CurlAsyncHTTPClient, provided specialized libcurl functionality (such as custom proxy configurations or specific TLS options) is not required. The default client enforces strict size boundaries on compressed and uncompressed response bodies. 2. Network egress filtering: Implement firewall rules or egress network policies to restrict outbound HTTP/HTTPS connections exclusively to verified, trustworthy endpoints, preventing the client from contacting potentially malicious third-party servers. 3. Operational controls: Ensure that user-supplied or untrusted URLs are validated, sanitized, or rejected before initiating outbound retrieval requests. Caveats: Switching the HTTP client backend from CurlAsyncHTTPClient to SimpleAsyncHTTPClient may disrupt services that depend on libcurl-specific features. Enforcing egress filtering may block connections to unlisted external services.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 4 days ago·verify at source
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