High [CVE-2026-14535] Arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization bypass

In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set.

When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not.

The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist.

With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE.

The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed.

Affected product named by the advisory: Exploit Intelligence.