High [CVE-2026-43866] Apache Camel JMS components: Arbitrary Exchange state injection
This high-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-43866 affecting Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.3 for Spring Boot 3.5.16.
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Summary
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.
ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*.
However org.apache.camel.support. DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check.
The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception.
Affected product named by the advisory: Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.3 for Spring Boot 3.5.16.
- < 3.0.0
- < 4.14.8
- < 4.15.0
- < 4.18.3
- < 4.19.0
- < 4.21.0
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 3 hours ago·verify at source
- 4.21.0
- 4.14
- 4.14.8
- 4.18
- 4.18.3
- camel-jms
- RHSA-2026:54622
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 3 hours ago·verify at source
Mitigation checklist
- Restrict publish access to JMS queues and topics consumed by Camel applications via broker authorization. Note that a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes within the org.apache.camel namespace.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 3 hours ago·verify at source
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