Medium [CVE-2026-49363] Pre-auth topology disclosure via CORE SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY_V2 on channel0
This medium-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-49363 affecting Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.13.6, Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1 for RHEL 10.
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Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker connecting with the CORE protocol can discover cluster node details by sending a SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY request prior to authentication. This issue affects Apache Artemis: from 2.50.0 through 2.56.0; Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: from 1.0.0 through 2.44.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.57.0, which fixes the issue. The SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY_V2 handler in CoreProtocolManager.
LocalChannelHandler.handlePacket() processes topology subscription requests on channel0 with zero authentication -- no call to getSecurityStore(), no credential verification, no subject validation.
An unauthenticated attacker can send a single 5-byte packet on the CORE protocol (via:8080 HTTP-upgrade in EAP or:61616 in AMQ Broker) to obtain the broker's nodeID (type-1 UUID embedding MAC address), internal hostname/IP, port numbers, connector configurations, and backup/scale-down group names.
In clustered deployments, a persistent ClusterTopologyListener is registered that continuously pushes all topology changes to the unauthenticated client. This contrasts with the federation handler in the same file which was fixed via ARTEMIS-5928 (CVE-2026-27446).
The leaked nodeID UUID seed directly enables session-name brute-force for REATTACH_SESSION session hijack. Red Hat severity: Moderate — CVSS 5.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).
Weakness: CWE-306.
- 2.50.0
- 2.56.0
- 1.0.0
- 2.44.0
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 14 days ago·verify at source
- 2.57.0
- artemis-server
- eap8-activemq-artemis-0:2.40.0-8.redhat_00024.1.el10eap
- eap8-apache-cxf-0:4.1.7-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-artemis-wildfly-integration-0:2.0.5-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-bouncycastle-0:1.85.0-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-cryptacular-0:1.2.7-1.redhat_00002.1.el10eap
- eap8-eap-product-conf-parent-0:801.8.0-1.GA_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-hibernate-0:6.6.54-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-httpcomponents-asyncclient-0:4.1.5-5.redhat_00008.1.el10eap
- eap8-ironjacamar-0:3.0.22-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-annotations-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-core-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-databind-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-dataformats-text-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-jaxrs-providers-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-modules-base-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jackson-modules-java8-0:2.18.9-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-jakarta-xml-bind-api-0:4.0.5-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jaxb-0:4.0.7-4.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jaxbintros-0:2.1.0-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jboss-logging-0:3.6.3-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jboss-remoting-0:5.0.31-1.SP2_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jbossws-api-0:3.1.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jbossws-common-tools-0:2.2.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jbossws-cxf-0:7.4.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jbossws-jaxws-undertow-httpspi-0:3.0.1-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jbossws-spi-0:5.1.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-jsf-impl-0:4.0.11-2.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-log4j-0:2.25.4-1.redhat_00003.1.el10eap
- eap8-neethi-0:3.2.2-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-netty-0:4.1.136-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-netty-transport-native-epoll-0:4.1.136-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-nimbus-jose-jwt-0:9.37.4-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-parsson-0:1.1.9-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-saaj-impl-0:3.0.6-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-slf4j-0:2.0.18-1.redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-undertow-0:2.3.26-2.SP3_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-wildfly-0:8.1.8-9.GA_redhat_00006.1.el10eap
- eap8-wildfly-elytron-0:2.6.11-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el10eap
- eap8-wildfly-javadocs-0:8.1.1-12.GA_redhat_00048.1.el10eap
- RHSA-2026:66545
- RHSA-2026:66488
- RHSA-2026:70230
- RHSA-2026:70228
- RHSA-2026:70229
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 14 days ago·verify at source
Mitigation checklist
- 1. Remove Core protocol from internet-facing acceptors -- configure the protocols parameter to exclude Core protocol on any acceptor receiving untrusted connections. In EAP, the :8080 HTTP-upgrade acceptor supports Core by default; restricting to AMQP/STOMP/OpenWire prevents the attack entirely. 2. Enable mutual TLS -- configure sslEnabled=true with needClientAuth=true on all Core protocol acceptors. TLS handshake failure occurs before any protocol-level packet can be sent. 3. Disable HTTP-upgrade for Core protocol if not required -- remove the http-upgrade element from the Artemis acceptor configuration to eliminate the :8080 attack surface.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 14 days ago·verify at source
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