Medium [CVE-2026-53078] Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg, the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the destination register in the!fullsock /!locked_tcp_sock path.

Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock / is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the ctx pointer.

When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale ctx pointer: - SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer, leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock(). - SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.

Fix both macros by: - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the added instruction. - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register restore in the!fullsock path, placed after the restore because dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) socket operations (sock_ops) program.