Medium [CVE-2026-72178] always put unsuccessfully committed target pids
This medium-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-72178 affecting Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat package: kernel.
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Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: always put unsuccessfully committed target pids damon_commit_target() puts and gets the destination and the source target pids. It puts the destination target pid because it will be overwritten by the source target pid.
It gets the source pid because the caller is supposed to eventually put the pids. In more detail, the caller will call damon_destroy_ctx() after damon_commit_ctx() to destroy the entire source context.
And in this case, [f]vaddr operation set's cleanup_target() callback will put the pids. The commit operation is made at the context level.
The operation can fail in multiple places including in the middle and after the targets commit operations. For any such failures, immediately the error is returned to the damon_commit_ctx() caller.
If some or all of the source target pids were committed to the destination during the unsuccessful context commit attempt, those pids should be put twice. The source context will do the put operations using the above explained routine.
The destination does not have the cleanup_target() ops callback, so it cannot put the pids via the damon_destroy_ctx(). As a result, the pids are leaked.
The issue in the real world would be not very common.
Affected products named by the advisory: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; Red Hat package: kernel.
Affected versions
No affected-version range was extracted from the source record. The vendor advisory is authoritative — check it before change work.
Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 24 days ago·verify at source
Fixed versions
No fixed release is recorded yet. That does not prove no patch exists — confirm against the vendor advisory.
Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 24 days ago·verify at source
Mitigation
The source record does not include mitigation steps. That is not a statement that no fix exists — read the vendor advisory below for the authoritative guidance.
Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 24 days ago·verify at source
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