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Medium5.5Red Hat Linux

Medium [CVE-2026-74484] don't let an 'F' entry pin its own instance

This medium-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-74484 affecting Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.

CVE-2026-74484 Published Aug 15, 2026Updated by vendor Aug 15, 2026
Affected products & platforms
Red Hat LinuxLinux Kernel
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Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: don't let an 'F' entry pin its own instance An entry registered with 'F' opens its interpreter at registration time and holds that file until the entry is freed. Any entry nobody removes by hand only gets closed once the binfmt_misc superblock is shut down.

If the interpreter lives on a mount that keeps that superblock alive the two pin each other: binfmt_misc sb -> inode -> entry -> interp_file -> vfsmount -> binfmt_misc sb TL;DR the file is never closed. Once the mount namespace is gone there is nothing left to unregister through either.

There are two ways to trigger this bug: - Point the interpreter at the instance itself. Its files are regular files owned by the mounter and both bm_get_inode() and simple_fill_super() leave i_op at empty_iops.

So notify_change() falls back to simple_setattr() and chmod +x works. We never set SB_I_NOEXEC and so open_exec() accepts it. - Use the instance as an overlayfs lower layer.

The overlay superblock holds a clone_private_mount() of every layer until it is destroyed and that clone is in no namespace. So umount_tree() never reaches it.

That's a DoS. And it isn't only the superblock that leaks.

It pins the user namespace it was mounted in, so every iteration permanently eats one of the caller's user namespace charges. So let's just do the sane thing.

Affected versions

No affected-version range was extracted from the source record. The vendor advisory is authoritative — check it before change work.

Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 1 hour ago·verify at source

Fixed versions

No fixed release is recorded yet. That does not prove no patch exists — confirm against the vendor advisory.

Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 1 hour ago·verify at source

Mitigation

The source record does not include mitigation steps. That is not a statement that no fix exists — read the vendor advisory below for the authoritative guidance.

Official advisory · medium-confidence parse· fetched 1 hour ago·verify at source

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