High [CVE-2026-95168] Arbitrary code execution via insecure rule loading
This high-severity Red Hat Linux advisory covers CVE-2026-95168.
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Summary
Arbitrary code execution via insecure rule loading. Red Hat rates this important (CVSS 7.3).
Weakness: CWE-427.
Affected versions
No affected-version range was extracted from the source record. The vendor advisory is authoritative — check it before change work.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 12 hours ago·verify at source
Fixed versions
No fixed release is recorded yet. That does not prove no patch exists — confirm against the vendor advisory.
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 12 hours ago·verify at source
Mitigation checklist
- Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to eliminate automatic discovery and top-level code execution of rule modules from untrusted sys.path directories in thefuck prior to enablement gating: upgrade to the fixed Thefuck builds, which restrict loading third-party rules to directories not writable by other users, closing planting a crafted thefuck_contrib_* package in a writable sys.path directory. Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux systems where multiple users share Python environments or where sys.path directories are writable by untrusted users — Standard Red Hat Enterprise Linux installations without Fedora or EPEL packages are unaffected — so Audit and restrict write permissions across all directories in sys.path, shared virtual environments, and group-writable site-packages to prevent untrusted users from placing files. As a compensating measure, Audit process spawn and file access events via auditd when rule modules in sys.path are loaded and executed, Enforce SELinux in enforcing mode with confined user mappings to bound execution privileges and restrict unauthorized operations, Restrict filesystem access paths via Landlock LSM sandboxing to prevent reading or importing from untrusted writable directories, Isolate filesystem mount namespaces to prevent the application from resolving modules planted in shared or world-writable directories, Deploy endpoint detection and response agents to detect anomalous child process execution or suspicious behavioral activity during rule import, and Monitor kernel syscall activity using Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect unexpected process spawns from imported rules. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying insecure rule loading defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-301 SELinux (Enforcing Mode) (medium)
Official advisory · high-confidence parse· fetched 12 hours ago·verify at source
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