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No fix, workaround or mitigation extracted yet
A malicious user could craft input that is stored in conversation memory and later interpreted by the model in an unintended way. Applications using the affected advisor with user-controlled input may be susceptible to manipulation of model behavior across conversation turns.
Spring AI's chat memory component contained a problematic default that, when not explicitly overridden, could result in unintended data exposure between users.
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A buffer overflow vulnerability in the formWep(), formWlAc(), formPasswordSetup(), formUpgradeCert(), and formDelcert() functions of the “webs” binary in Zyxel NWA1100-N customized firmware version 1.00(AACE.1)C0 could allow an attacker to trigger a denial-of-service (DoS) condition by sending a crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable device.
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A command injection vulnerability in the CGI program of Zyxel WRE6505 v2 firmware version V1.00(ABDV.3)C0 could allow an adjacent attacker on the LAN to execute operating system (OS) commands on a vulnerable device by sending a crafted HTTP request.
An exposed dangerous method on the Core Server of Ivanti Endpoint Manager before version 2024 SU6 allows a remote authenticated attacker to leak access credentials.
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** An insecure storage of sensitive information vulnerability in the configuration file of Zyxel WRE6505 v2 firmware version V1.00(ABDV.3)C0 could allow a local attacker with administrator privileges to download and decrypt a backup configuration file.
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** An improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the web management interface of Zyxel WRE6505 v2 firmware version V1.00(ABDV.3)C0 could allow an adjacent attacker on the LAN to brute-force the password and bypass authentication.
Netgate pfSense CE 2.8.0 allows code execution in the XMLRPC API via pfsense.exec_php. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because the API call is only available to admins and they are intentionally allowed to execute PHP code.
Netgate pfSense CE 2.7.2 allows code execution by using the module installer with a backup file with a serialized PHP object containing the post_reboot_commands property. NOTE: the Supplier disputes this because this installer is only available to admins and they are intentionally allowed to execute PHP code.
Improper certificate validation in Ivanti EPMM before versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to enroll a device belonging to a restricted set of unenrolled devices, leading to information disclosure about EPMM appliance and impacting on the integrity of the newly enrolled device identity.
An Improper Access Control in Ivanti EPMM before versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to invoke arbitrary methods.
An Improper Certificate Validation in Ivanti EPMM before versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to impersonate registered Sentry hosts and obtain valid CA-signed client certificates.
An Improper Access Control vulnerability in Ivanti EPMM before versions 12.6.1.1, 12.7.0.1, and 12.8.0.1 allows a remote authenticated attacker to gain administrative access.
In today’s rapidly evolving technology and threat landscape, responsible transparency should be a cornerstone of any product security program. Especially with the advancements in AI, we believe it is important to respond quickly when a new risk is discovered. Ivanti’s efforts integrating AI into our development and product security process have increased the capabilities of our Engineering and Product Security Red Teams to identify and fix vulnerabilities. Our objective in proactively discovering issues is to increase the resilience of our products in today’s threat environment and reduce the likelihood of exploited-in-the-wild Zero Days. We have already successfully identified vulnerabilities traditional tools missed, including some that are being disclosed today. Importantly, we are committed to using AI responsibly in product security, including keeping a human in the loop to verify automated or agentic work. Our top priority is the security of our customers, and we expect that this work will naturally increase the number of vulnerabilities found, fixed, and disclosed. While this will result in an uptick in disclosures, we see this as a good thing, and an important part of ensuring our products keep pace with modern security requirements as they change.
Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Agent discovery service on Windows allows Overflow Buffers. An unauthenticated attacker on the same local network could exploit this vulnerability to crash the agent service.
In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected catalog to have `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that the catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into stored table state. Later table-load and credential APIs can then return temporary cloud-storage credentials for the same location without revalidating it. In plain terms, Polaris can later hand out temporary storage access for the same attacker-chosen area. That attacker-chosen area does not need to be limited to the poisoned table's own files. If it is a broader storage prefix, another table's prefix, or, depending on configuration or provider behavior, even a bucket/container root, the resulting disclosure or corruption scope can extend to any data and metadata Polaris can reach there. The practical consequences are therefore similar to the staged-create credential-vending issue already discussed: data and metadata reachable in that storage scope can be exposed and, if write-capable credentials are later issued, modified, corrupted, or removed. Even before that later credential step, Polaris itself performs the metadata write to the unchecked location. So the core issue is not only later credential vending. The primary defect is that Polaris skips its intended location checks before performing a security- sensitive metadata write when only `write.metadata.path` changes. When `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=false`, current code review suggests the later `updateTableLike(...)` validation usually rejects out-of-tree metadata locations before the unsafe path is persisted. That may reduce the persisted / credential-vending variant, but it does not prevent the underlying defect: Polaris still skips the intended pre-write location check when only `write.metadata.path` changes.
In plain terms, Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a crafted namespace or table name can cause those credentials to work across the configured bucket instead. Apache Polaris builds Google Cloud Storage downscoped credentials by creating a Credential Access Boundary (CAB) with CEL conditions that are intended to restrict access to the requested table's storage path. The relevant CEL string is built from the bucket name and the table path. That table path is derived from namespace and table identifiers. In current code, that path appears to be inserted into the CEL expression without escaping. As a result, a namespace or table identifier containing a single quote and other URI-safe CEL fragments can break out of the intended quoted string and change the meaning of the CEL condition. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 on real Google Cloud Storage, it was confirmed that Polaris accepted a crafted identifier and returned delegated GCS credentials whose CEL path restriction had effectively collapsed. Those delegated credentials could then: - list another table's object prefix; - read another table's metadata control file (Iceberg metadata JSON); - create and delete an object under another table's object prefix; - and also list, read, create, and delete objects under an unrelated external prefix in the same bucket that was not part of any table path. That last point is important. The issue is not limited to "another table". In the confirmed setup, once Apache Polaris returned credentials for the crafted table, the path restriction inside the configured bucket was effectively gone. The practical effect is that temporary credentials for one crafted table can be broader than the table Polaris was asked to authorize, and can become effectively bucket-wide within the configured bucket. The current GCS testing used a Polaris principal with broad catalog privileges for setup. A separate least-privilege Polaris RBAC variant has not yet been tested on GCS. However, the storage-credential broadening behavior itself has been confirmed on GCS.
Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions. In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary- credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations. The confirmed behavior includes: - reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]); - listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]); - and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating and deleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix. A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access. A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that setup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the attacker could still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use those credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`. In Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which data files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table version to read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful confidentiality problem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited to disclosure.
Apache Polaris can issue broad temporary ("vended") storage credentials during staged table creation before the effective table location has been validated or durably reserved. Those temporary credentials are meant to limit the scope of accessible table data and metadata, but this scope limitation becomes attacker- directed because the attacker can choose a reachable target location. In the confirmed variant, if the caller supplies a custom `location` during stage create and requests credential vending, Apache Polaris uses that location to construct delegated storage credentials immediately. The stage-create path itself neither runs the normal location validation nor the overlap checks before those credentials are issued. Closely related to that, the staged-create flow also accepts `write.data.path` / `write.metadata.path` in the request properties and feeds those location overrides into the same effective table location set used for credential vending. Those fields are secondary to the main custom-`location` exploit, but they are still attacker-influenced location inputs that should be validated before any credentials are issued.
Apache Airflow's SMTP provider `SmtpHook` called Python's `smtplib.SMTP.starttls()` without an SSL context, so no certificate validation was performed on the TLS upgrade. A man-in-the-middle between the Airflow worker and the SMTP server could present a self-signed certificate, complete the STARTTLS upgrade, and capture the SMTP credentials sent during the subsequent `login()` call. Users are advised to upgrade to the `apache-airflow-providers-smtp` version that contains the fix.