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Critical [CVE-2026-28672] Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Apache Ranger
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Apache Ranger. This issue affects Apache Ranger: from 0.6 through 2.8.
Critical [CVE-2026-34191] Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Portable Runtime Utility via apr_dbd_oracle provider
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Apache Portable Runtime Utility via apr_dbd_oracle provider. This issue affects Apache Portable Runtime Utility: from 1.6.0 through 1.6.3
Critical [CVE-2026-42812] In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and
In Apache Iceberg, the table's metadata files are control files: they tell readers which data files belong to the table and which table version to read. `write.metadata.path` is an optional table property that tells Polaris where to write those metadata files. For a table already registered in a Polaris-managed catalog, changing only that property through an `ALTER TABLE`-style settings change (not a row-level `INSERT`, `SELECT`, `UPDATE`, or `DELETE`) bypasses the commit-time branch that is supposed to revalidate storage locations. The full persisted / credential-vending variant requires the affected to have `polaris.config.allow.unstructured.table.location=true`, with `allowedLocations` broad enough to include the attacker-chosen target. `allowedLocations` is the admin-configured allowlist of storage paths that catalog is allowed to use. Public project materials suggest that this flag is a real supported compatibility / layout mode, not just a contrived lab-only prerequisite. In that configuration, a user who can change table settings can cause Apache Polaris itself to write new table metadata to an attacker-chosen reachable storage location before the intended location-validation branch runs. If the later concrete-path validation also accepts that location, Polaris persists the resulting metadata path into stored table state. table-load
Critical [CVE-2026-42811] In plain terms, Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a…
In plain terms, Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a crafted namespace or table name can cause those credentials to work across the configured bucket instead. Apache Polaris builds Google Cloud Storage downscoped credentials by creating a Credential Access Boundary (CAB) with CEL conditions that are intended to restrict access to the requested table's storage path. The relevant CEL string is built from the bucket name and the table path. table path is derived from namespace and table identifiers. In current code, that path appears to be inserted into the CEL expression without escaping. As a result, a namespace or table identifier containing a single quote other URI-safe CEL fragments can break out of the intended quoted string change the meaning of the CEL condition. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 on real Google Cloud Storage, it was confirmed that Polaris accepted a crafted identifier and returned delegated credentials whose CEL path restriction had effectively collapsed. Those delegated credentials could then: - list another table's object prefix; - read another table's metadata control file (Iceberg metadata JSON); - and also list, read, create, and delete objects under an unrelated external prefix in the same bucket that was not part of any table path. That last point is important.
Critical [CVE-2026-42810] Apache Polaris: Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names.
Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns `s3:prefix` conditions. In S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as ordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table can match the storage path of a different table. In private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary- credential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for crafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other tables' S3 locations. The confirmed behavior includes: - reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]); - listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]); - and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating A control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same cross-table access. A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker principal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the minimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table (namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that
Critical [CVE-2026-42809] Apache Polaris can issue broad temporary ("vended") storage credentials during staged table creation before the effective table…
Apache Polaris can issue broad temporary ("vended") storage credentials during staged table creation before the effective table location has been validated or durably reserved. Those temporary credentials are meant to limit the scope of accessible table data and metadata, but this scope limitation becomes attacker- In the confirmed variant, if the caller supplies a custom `location` during stage create and requests credential vending, Apache Polaris uses that location to construct delegated storage credentials immediately. The stage-create path itself neither runs the normal location validation nor the overlap checks before those credentials are issued. `write.data.path` / `write.metadata.path` in the request properties feeds those location overrides into the same effective table location set used for Those fields are secondary to the main custom-`location` be
Critical [CVE-2026-41873] ** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability…
- * UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in Pony Mail leading to admin account takeover. This issue affects all versions of the Lua implementation of Pony Mail. There is a Python implementation under development under the name "Pony Mail Foal" that is not affected by this issue, but hasn't been released yet. As the Lua implementation of this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative or restrict access to the instance to trusted users. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
Critical [CVE-2026-33557] Apache Kafka: Missing JWT token validation in OAUTHBEARER authentication
A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka. By default, the broker property `sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class` is set to `org.apache.kafka.common.security.oauthbearer. DefaultJwtValidator`. It accepts any JWT token without validating its signature, issuer, or audience. An attacker can generate a JWT token from any issuer with the `preferred_username` set to any user, and the broker will accept it. Since Kafka v4.1.2 and v4.2.0 and later, the issue is fixed and will correctly validate the JWT token.