CVE-2026-17039
CVE-2026-17039: 1 tracked advisory record across Red Hat. Compare source-reported impact, fixes and remediation.
Compare the source-linked records below. Ratings and product/version details belong to each advisory; they are not a single CVE-wide score or proof that every listed product is affected. How VulniPulse collects and checks evidence.
Vendor advisory comparison
Red Hat
1 advisory- Advisory severityLow3.1
Low [CVE-2026-17039] CA renewal request processing omits realm authorization check performed by enrollment path
CVE-2026-17039Source published Source updated
A flaw was found in pki-core. The certificate authority (CA) renewal request path does not perform the realm-based authorization check that the enrollment path performs, allowing an authenticated user entitled to one realm to cause a certificate belonging to a different realm to be renewed without that realm's authorization. Red Hat Product Security assessed this issue as having Low impact. However, exploitation additionally requires a non-default, though supported, deployment configuration: a realm-mapped authorization manager configured for multi-tenant or delegated sub-CA (MSP-style) use. Deployments that do not configure this feature are not exposed to this issue. Direct testing was performed to determine the practical consequences of the confirmed bypass rather than relying on the…
- Affected products in this advisory
- Red Hat Certificate System 10
- Red Hat Certificate System 11
- Red Hat Certificate System 9
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10
6 more entries in the full advisory.
- Source-reported affected versions
- Affected-version details not available in this record.
- Source-reported fixed versions
- No fixed-version detail extracted. This does not mean no fix exists.
- Mitigation guidance
- Deployments that do not configure a realm-mapped authorization manager (AuthzRealmDefault with a non-default realm-to-authorization-manager mapping) for multi-tenant or delegated sub-CA use are not exposed to this issue. For deployments that do use realm-based authorization, using a renewal profile that additionally restricts renewal requests to the original requester narrows exposure: the shipped caDirUserRenewal.cfg profile configures authz.acl=user_origreq="auth_token.uid", which independently blocks cross-user renewal by comparing the renewing caller's UID against the UID that submitted the original request. This is a partial mitigation only -- it is realm-blind rather than realm-aware, so a UID collision across two independently-administered realms' user directories would still bypass it -- and it does not apply to caManualRenewal.cfg or other shipped renewal profiles that configure no authz.acl, which remain exploitable as described. No complete mitigation is available; apply the update once released.
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