Docker Docker Desktop Vulnerabilities & Security Advisories
14 advisories tracked · Docker Security (security@docker.com CNA) + NVD · 0 listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Every row below is a published Docker advisory that VulniPulse classified as Docker Desktop, with the CVEs, affected and fixed releases and exploitation status the vendor stated. Severity mix: 1 critical, 7 high, 6 medium.
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Docker Security (security@docker.com CNA) + NVD
Docker Inc. is its own CVE Numbering Authority. VulniPulse ingests Docker's CVEs from the NVD CNA feed (security@docker.com) — Docker Desktop, Docker CLI, Docker Model Runner and Docker Sandboxes — and merges in the open-source engine components that publish under their own project CNAs (Moby, the Docker Engine upstream; BuildKit; containerd) via a subject-anchored NVD keyword feed that drops the heavy 'third-party app runs in a Docker Compose stack' noise. Docker Desktop / Engine is a near-universal part of every developer and homelab stack.
Latest Docker Docker Desktop advisories
High [CVE-2026-106581] Before 4.92.0, Docker Desktop for Windows did not verify the signature of a package supplied to Docker Desktop Installer.exe install -package
Before 4.92.0, Docker Desktop for Windows did not verify the signature of a package supplied to Docker Desktop Installer.exe install -package. An attacker able to provide a crafted package and convince a user to approve the Docker-signed UAC prompt could execute attacker-controlled installer actions as LocalSystem.
High [CVE-2026-79994] The guest-to-host Unix-domain socket relay in Docker Sandboxes validates that a socket path is inside an authorized workspace, but later reconnects using the pathname
The guest-to-host Unix-domain socket relay in Docker Sandboxes validates that a socket path is inside an authorized workspace, but later reconnects using the pathname. A malicious guest can replace an intermediate directory with a symlink between validation and connection, causing the host to connect to an arbitrary AF_UNIX socket outside the shared workspace. This can expose data or host-side capabilities provided by the targeted socket.
High [CVE-2026-17106] The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory
The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process. Affected products named by the advisory: Docker Sandboxes; Docker Desktop; Docker Engine; Docker CLI; and 1 more. Affected products named by the advisory: Docker Compose.
High [CVE-2026-8936] Docker Desktop: Fixed a VM panic caused by unbounded recursion in the grpcfuse kernel module when a container created deeply nested directories on a bind-mounted host folder and triggered a dentry invalidation event
Fixed a VM panic caused by unbounded recursion in the grpcfuse kernel module when a container created deeply nested directories on a bind-mounted host folder and triggered a dentry invalidation event. This issue has been fixed in Docker Desktop 4.76.0.
High [CVE-2026-5843] Docker Desktop: The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
High [CVE-2026-5817] Docker Desktop: The vllm-metal inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS unconditionally sets trust_remote_code=True when loading model tokenizers, and runs without sandboxing
The vllm-metal inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS unconditionally sets trust_remote_code=True when loading model tokenizers, and runs without sandboxing. This causes transformers. AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained() to import and execute arbitrary Python files included in any model pulled from an OCI registry, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user when inference is triggered. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model and request inference.
High [CVE-2026-6406] The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop
The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig. Mounts field rather than the HostConfig. Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials. A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.