Medium [CVE-2026-81930] Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs

Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs.

The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host.

The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection's private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token.

A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint.

No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL.

Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection's credentials.