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27 advisories across 32 monitored vendors.
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Critical [CVE-2026-66906] Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure Storage Blob component
Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure Storage Blob component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-azure-storage-blob component can download an Azure Storage blob to the local filesystem through its download BlobToFile operation, writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option, which is documented as usable from both the producer and the consumer. BlobOperations.download BlobToFile built the local target by joining fileDir with the remote blob name exactly as the Azure SDK reported it (new File(fileDir, client.getBlobName())) and passed the result straight to the SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The blob name is not route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the container in BlobConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromContainer, which lists blobs and creates one exchange per entry from BlobItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name filtering by default. A blob name containing parent-directory segments therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone able to influence the names present in the consumed container cause Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the privileges of the Camel process.
High [CVE-2026-66908] Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component
Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for.
High [CVE-2026-66907] Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Google Storage component
Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Google Storage component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-google-storage consumer downloads Google Cloud Storage objects to the local filesystem when the download FileName option is set. That option is documented as a folder or a filename, and when its value contains no expression token the consumer builds the local destination by appending the object name to it: evaluateFileExpression sets the Exchange file-name header to the remote object name and evaluates download FileName + "/${file:name}". The ${file:name} token returns the file-name header verbatim, unlike ${file:onlyname}, which applies FileUtil.stripPath to it. The resulting string was passed directly to new File(result) and blob.download To(file.toPath()) with no lexical normalization and no check that the destination stayed inside the configured directory. The object name is not route-controlled data: the consumer lists the bucket, iterates every returned blob and creates one exchange per object from blob.getBlobId().getName() verbatim, and the filter option that could restrict those names is not applied at all unless it has been explicitly set.
Medium [CVE-2026-75099] Unauthenticated REST disclosure of certain content items in Apache Allura
Unauthenticated REST disclosure of certain content items in Apache Allura. This issue affects Apache Allura: through 1.19.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.20.0, which fixes the issue.
Medium [CVE-2025-27636 +5] Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Knative component The Knative consumer in camel-knative maps inbound CloudEvent attributes onto Camel message headers
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Knative component The Knative consumer in camel-knative maps inbound CloudEvent attributes onto Camel message headers. In binary content mode the HTTP-header path filters Camel-internal headers through KnativeHttpHeaderFilterStrategy, but in structured content mode (Content-Type application/cloudevents+json) the CloudEvent extension fields are read directly from the JSON body and every extension key is copied into the Exchange headers without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (CloudEventProcessors, spec versions 1.0, 1.0.1 and 1.0.2). As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can inject Camel-internal headers (e.g. CamelHttpUri, CamelHttpPath, CamelFileName) via a structured-mode CloudEvent request, matched case-insensitively against Camel's header map. When a route forwards messages from a Knative consumer to a header-driven component such as camel-http or camel-file, the injected headers override configured values, enabling server-side request forgery (SSRF), path traversal or message-dispatch redirection depending on the route.
Medium [CVE-2026-60093] Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure-Storage Datalake component This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0
Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure-Storage Datalake component This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-azure-storage-datalake component can download an Azure Data Lake Storage Gen2 file to the local filesystem through its download ToFile operation, writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option. DataLakeFileOperations.download ToFile built the local target by joining fileDir with the remote path name exactly as the Azure SDK reported it (new File(fileDir, fileClientWrapper.getFileName())) and passed the result straight to the SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The remote name is not route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the filesystem in DataLakeConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromPath, which lists paths and creates one exchange per entry from PathItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name filtering by default. A path name containing parent-directory segments therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone able to influence the names present in the consumed Data Lake filesystem cause Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the privileges of the Camel process.
Medium [CVE-2026-59230] Improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel
Improper input validation vulnerability in Apache Camel. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.17.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-mail component ships a MimeMultipart data format that can unmarshal a MIME multipart message. When it is configured with headersInline set to true, the unmarshal path copies the MIME headers of the incoming message onto the Camel message: it enumerates every header that is not one of the three standard ones it generates itself - Message-ID, MIME-Version and Content-Type - and calls setHeader for each, applying no HeaderFilterStrategy. The names of those MIME headers come from the message being unmarshalled, so a sender able to influence the message could place a header whose name falls in the Camel-internal namespace and have it set on the Exchange. Camel components read control headers from that namespace to override their configured behaviour - the camel-sql producer, for instance, takes the statement to execute from a Camel header when one is present - so an injected header could redirect what a downstream step in the route does with data the route author never intended it to take from the message. Which sinks are reachable, and what the consequences are, depends entirely on what the route does after the unmarshal step.