Docker Docker CLI / Scout Vulnerabilities & Security Advisories
3 advisories tracked · Docker Security (security@docker.com CNA) + NVD · 0 listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Every row below is a published Docker advisory that VulniPulse classified as Docker CLI / Scout, with the CVEs, affected and fixed releases and exploitation status the vendor stated. Severity mix: 3 high.
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Docker Security (security@docker.com CNA) + NVD
Docker Inc. is its own CVE Numbering Authority. VulniPulse ingests Docker's CVEs from the NVD CNA feed (security@docker.com) — Docker Desktop, Docker CLI, Docker Model Runner and Docker Sandboxes — and merges in the open-source engine components that publish under their own project CNAs (Moby, the Docker Engine upstream; BuildKit; containerd) via a subject-anchored NVD keyword feed that drops the heavy 'third-party app runs in a Docker Compose stack' noise. Docker Desktop / Engine is a near-universal part of every developer and homelab stack.
Latest Docker Docker CLI / Scout advisories
High [CVE-2026-17106] The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory
The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process. Affected products named by the advisory: Docker Sandboxes; Docker Desktop; Docker Engine; Docker CLI; and 1 more. Affected products named by the advisory: Docker Compose.
High [CVE-2026-6406] The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop
The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig. Mounts field rather than the HostConfig. Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials. A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.
High [CVE-2025-15558] Docker Desktop Docker Plugins Uncontrolled Search Path Element Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Docker CLI for Windows searches for plugin binaries in C:\ProgramData\Docker\cli-plugins, a directory that does not exist by default. A low-privileged attacker can create this directory and place malicious CLI plugin binaries (docker-compose.exe, docker-buildx.exe, etc.) that are executed when a victim user opens Docker Desktop or invokes Docker CLI plugin features, and allow privilege-escalation if the docker CLI is executed as a privileged user. This issue affects Docker CLI: through 29.1.5 and Windows binaries acting as a CLI-plugin manager using the github.com/docker/cli/cli-plugins/manager package, such as Docker Compose. This issue does not impact non-Windows binaries, and projects not using the plugin-manager code.